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International Migration, Income Taxes and Transfers:
A Welfare Analysis
Introduction
In the absence of income taxes, transfers and public goods, the literature on international migration, when emigrants possess only labor, has established that (i) finite permanent migration is beneficial for the nationals in the destination country and detrimental for people left behind in the source country, and (ii) marginal permanent migration has no welfare effects in either country (e.g., Berry and Soligo 1969) . Wong (1985) and Quibria (1988) extend these results to the case with many goods and factors and to the case where goods prices are endogenously determined or exogenously fixed. In an economy with traded and non-traded goods, Rivera-Batiz (1982) showed that the level of welfare of remaining residents falls as a result of emigration or at best remains the same. The latter possibility emerges when both emigrants and non-emigrants have identical endowments of productive factors. Djajic (1998) , in a model with traded and non-traded goods shows that in the presence of foreign capital, the previous welfare effects may be reversed.
While the international migration theory predicts that in most cases immigration benefits the residents in the host country, in reality, we observed that most developed countries oppose free immigration. Some argue that this opposition is not only due to the effects of immigration on the local labor market, but also due to the fiscal effects of immigration. That is, the fiscal burdens to host economies due to immigration. Specifically, in modern economies, governments impose income taxes and implement programs, which transfer income in cash or in kind e.g., health, education. It is subsequently maintained that immigrant contributions, through taxes, to sustain such programs fall short of the benefits immigrants enjoy from their provision. In advanced countries, the government expenditure as a percentage of GDP amounts between 30 to 50 percent.
The fact that in modern economies, governments impose income taxes, make income transfers and provide public goods has only recently been introduced explicitly in the welfare analysis of international migration. Wildasin (1994) using a single good model with income taxes and transfers shows, among other things, that free immigration may lead to pareto-inferior outcomes if in the no-immigration situation, owners of the immobile factor are being taxed to provide transfer payments to mobile workers. Wellisch and Wildasin (1996) , assuming that prices of goods are fixed, examine within a system of jurisdictions the effect of immigration in one jurisdiction. They show, among other things, that when each jurisdiction chooses optimal redistribution policies, the external effects are purely fiscal, that is, immigrants who make net fiscal payments (receipts) create external benefits (costs). Wellisch and Walz (1998) show that social welfare in countries with relatively small number of low-skilled native workers is higher with free trade than with free migration due to redistribution of income towards immigrating workers.
The purpose of this analysis is to examine some of the previous questions and related ones using a model with quite general assumptions regarding the structure of the economy. To this end, we build a general equilibrium model of a small open country where we allowed the existence of non-traded goods, international capital mobility and two classes of individuals. The capitalists who possess labor, capital and other factors of production, and the workers, who possess only labor. Migrants are from the group of workers. The government imposes income taxes and makes income transfers. Within this framework, we examine the effects of an exogenous migration in the host country's social and group welfare, with and without non-traded goods and international capital mobility. While most previous studies focus on the welfare effects of immigration on host countries, the present framework is quite general and enables us to reach conclusions for host and source countries alike. 1 We show, among other things, that in the absence of international capital mobility, marginal immigration hurts individuals already in the country regardless of whether or not nontraded goods exist. In the presence of international capital mobility, however, the above result could be reversed.
The Model
Consider an open economy producing a number of traded goods using labor, L, capital, K, and other factors of production (e.g., land function is assumed to be strictly concave in L and K (i.e., R LL and R KK are negative).
In equilibrium, the domestic rate of return to labor equals the factor's marginal revenue product (i.e., R L ) in the alternative domestic uses.
We consider an economy comprising of two classes of identical individuals, The country imposes income taxes and redistributes the tax revenue equally to all residents. 3 The country's income expenditure identity requires that expenditure by all capitalists and workers must equal the total net income from production plus transfer payments minus the net payments to foreign capital. That is
where K f is positive when the home country is a net importer of foreign capital and negative when it is a net exporter of capital, and r * is the world net rate of return to capital. Note that dK=dK f . Since capital is perfectly mobile internationally, equilibrium in the capital market requires that the domestic and world net rates of return to capital are equal. That is,
where ρ k is the linear income tax rate on non-wage income (i.e., income from capital and other factors of production).
The income expenditure identity for a representative worker requires that his expenditure equal his net income from work (i.e., net wage) plus the transfer payments from the government. The transfer payment that a representative worker receives equals total tax revenue divided by the total number of people in the country.
Thus, the income expenditure identity for the class of workers is given by
where L=L k + L w , and ρ L is the linear income tax rate on wage income. 4 A worker has an incentive to migrate if the total income earned in the host country (i.e., net income from work and fiscal benefits) is greater than income earned in the source country.
The Welfare Effects of Migration with Capital Mobility

Migration and social welfare
The social welfare function is defined as the sum of the utilities of all persons with equal weights and with constant number of individuals. 5 Total differentiation of (1) and (2), and noting r * is constant gives the social welfare effect of migration as follows:
where using equation shows how the tax revenue from taxing the return to capital is affected when migration occurs.
In the absence of international capital mobility (i.e., dK=K f =0) equation (2) does not hold and equations (1) and (3) are replaced by
Differentiating equation (1´) and using equation (3´), we get (dW/dL) = -λ. In this case, it becomes very clear that immigration (i.e., dL>0) reduces the social welfare of the host country. That is, the combined welfare of those workers and capitalists already in the host country decreases. The intuition is very simple. Since the immigrant possesses only labor, his income is less than the average income of those already in the country, and thus, he is a net fiscal beneficiary. That is, his receipts from the host government exceed his payments by the amount λ, at the expense of the total welfare of those already in the host country.
When capital is internationally mobile, the social welfare effects of migration could be reversed. We assume and maintain for the rest of the analysis that labor and capital are complements in production (i.e., R LK is positive). This is usually the case.
Then, the second term in equation (4) is of the opposite sign from the first term. In this case, immigration may increase the welfare of those already in the country when capital and labor are complements. That is, when a worker comes in the country, the marginal revenue product of capital increases causing capital inflow, and thus capital income and tax receipt increase. This increase in tax receipts could outweigh the cost due to the fact that the immigrant is a net fiscal beneficiary, in which case the combined welfare of capitalists and workers already in the host country rises. 
Migration and the welfare of the non-immigrating workers
Differentiating equation (2) and (3), we get the effect of migration on the welfare of non-migrating workers as follows:
where µ=(L w /L) is the percentage of workers in the total population.
In the absence of international capital mobility (i.e., K f =dK=0) equation (2) does not hold. Differentiating equation (3´), the effect of immigration on the welfare of workers already in the country is given by .
In this case, immigration entails two effects on the welfare of workers already residing in the host country. The first effect (i.e., µλ), which we call the net fiscal effect, and the second effect (i.e., ), which we call the wage effect. In this case, immigration decreases the welfare of the workers already in the host country, not only because the immigrating workers are net fiscal beneficiaries and thus less is left for the workers already residing there, but also because immigration decreases the marginal revenue product of labor and thus it decreases their wages.
When, however, capital is internationally mobile, the welfare effects are not so clear. The term in the first parenthesis on the right hand side of equation (5) is the same as the right hand side of equation (4) and has an ambiguous sign. The term in the second parenthesis on the right hand side (i.e., ( ), captures the effect of migration on wages directly, and indirectly, through the induced capital mobility, and is negative since it is assumed that the GDP function is strictly concave in factor supplies. Thus, in this case, the sufficient but not necessary condition for the welfare of the workers already in the country to decrease with immigration is that all people already in the country (workers and capitalists combined) are hurt from immigration, that is, the social welfare effect is negative.
Comparing the welfare effect of international immigration on workers when capital is internationally mobile to when it is not, assuming everything else is the same, we observe smaller losses to workers already in the host country in the former rather than in the latter case and we may even observe a reversal of the effect. That is, a possible welfare improvement for the workers already residing in the country.
Proposition 2. In the presence of income taxes and transfers and no international capital mobility, marginal immigration decreases the welfare of workers already in the country. The presence of internationally mobile capital decreases the welfare losses of marginal immigration on workers already in the country, and it may reverse
the effects. 
Migration and the welfare of capitalists.
Differentiating equation (1) and (2) and using equation (3), or subtracting equation (5) from (4), gives the effect of migration on the welfare of capitalists as follows:
In the absence of international capital mobility, differentiating equation (1´) and using (3´), the effect of migration on the welfare of capitalists is given by . Thus, in this case immigration through the net fiscal effect affects negatively the welfare of capitalists in the host country, while the impact through the wage effect, is positive. The total effect is ambiguous. The presence of international capital mobility has no clear effects on the welfare of capitalists. On the one hand, it reduces the negative effects of immigration on wages, affecting negatively the welfare of capitalists in the host country. On the other hand, it increases the net fiscal benefits to capitalists due to immigration.
Migration and Welfare in the Presence of Non-Traded Goods
Migration and social welfare
Consider now the case where along with many traded goods, a number of nontraded goods are produced. The prices of the non-traded goods are endogenously determined in their respective domestic markets. Migration induced changes in the prices of non-traded goods may reverse the welfare effects of migration. For simplicity, we now assume that capital is internationally immobile (i.e., dK=K f =0 and equation (2) does not hold). All the other assumptions of the model remain the same.
In the expenditure and GDP functions the price vector of the non-traded goods is included, while the GDP function now does not include K. The country's income expenditure identity in this case can be written as follows:
where q is the price vector of the non-traded goods. The equilibrium in the i th nontraded good market is achieved with the equality of demand and supply of the i th non-
where is the compensated demand for the i Differentiating (7) and using (8), we get that (dW/dL) = -λ. That is, the social welfare effect of migration is independent of the induced changes in the non-traded goods prices.
Proposition 3. In the presence of income taxes and transfers, and in the absence of international capital mobility, marginal immigration hurts those already in the host country whether or not non-traded goods exist in the economy.
Examining separately the effect of migration on the welfare of workers and capitalists better captures the intuition of this result.
Welfare effects on workers and capitalists
While total social welfare is not affected by changes in the prices of non-traded goods when capital is internationally immobile, the welfare of the two groups of people is affected by such changes. 9 In the presence of a nontraded good equation (3´) is replaced by
Differentiating equation (3´´) and (7) and using (3´´) and (8) gives for this case the effect of migration on workers and capitalists welfare as follows:
where
The new effect that is present in this case is the effect of changes in the prices of non-traded good on income and consumption. While for both groups an increase in the price of non-traded good makes the consumption of this good more expensive and thus it exerts a negative impact on their utility, the effect on income is different.
Actually, equations (9) and (10) show that the gain or the loss of one group is exactly equal to the loss or the gain of the other group, and thus social welfare is not affected by changes in non-traded goods prices. The effect of migration on the welfare of the two groups is generally ambiguous.
Totally differentiating equation (3´´), (7) and (8) 
where , and is positive invoking
Walrasian stability in the non-traded good market, and . The first right hand side term in equation (11) shows the effect of migration on the price of
9 From now on, we assume for simplicity that only one non-traded good exists. the non-traded good through its effect of the excess demand for this good, and is generally ambiguous, in part depending on the factor intensity of this good. 10 The second and third term shows the effect of migration on the price of the non-traded good through its effect on total income and demand for non-traded good and is generally ambiguous. In the special case where the marginal propensity to consume the non-traded good by workers is equal or greater than the marginal propensity to consume the same good by capitalists (i.e., e ), and the term R 
, and which is negative.
positive invoking Walrasian stability in the non-traded good market.
10 Since it is assumed for simplicity that there is a single non-traded good, we can say that it is labor (non-labor) intensive in production if .
The first term on the right hand side of equation (12) is negative and is the net fiscal effect that we have seen previously in the absence of capital mobility. The second term is present due to the fact that capital is internationally mobile and its sign is ambiguous. Through this second term, migration affects the return to capital, and thus welfare, directly, and indirectly through its effect on the price of the non-traded good. The direct effect is positive since it is assumed that R KL is positive, while the indirect effect is generally ambiguous. If the non-traded good is relatively capital intensive (i.e., R Kq >0, and R Lq <0), then this indirect effect is positive and reinforce the direct effect. If the non-traded good is relatively labor intensive (i.e., R Kq <0, and R Lq >0), and e then again this indirect effect is positive. If, however, , then this indirect effect is negative and it could outweigh the direct effect. Since most non-traded goods are services, we expect the non-traded goods to be relatively labor intensive. If in addition the non-traded goods are on average luxury goods, and thus their consumption by a representative worker is relatively small and strongly labor intensive (i.e., R qL is high), then we expect marginal immigration to reduce the welfare of those already in the country.
Concluding Remarks
We build a general equilibrium model of international migration of a small source or host country, producing many traded and non-traded goods, using capital, labor and other factors of production. Two classes of individuals exist in the source or host country. Workers, who possess only labor, and capitalists, who possess labor, capital and other factors of production. Individuals in each class are identical and migrants are from the group of workers. Migration is permanent in the sense that immigrants do not remit any of their income earnings in the host country to the source country. Each country imposes income taxes on wage and non wage income and redistributes the tax receipts equally to all individuals in the country. Capital is perfectly mobile internationally.
Within this framework, the paper shows that in the absence of capital mobility, marginal immigration hurts people already in the host country. These results hold whether or not non-traded goods exist in the country. In the presence of international capital mobility, however, the above results are weaker and it could be reversed.
In the absence of non-traded goods and capital mobility, marginal immigration hurts workers already in the country and marginal emigration benefits the initial group of workers in the source country. The presence of international capital mobility decreases the loses of marginal immigration on workers already in the country and decreases the benefits of marginal emigration on the initial group of workers in the source country and it may reverse the original effects. The effect of marginal migration on capitalists in the source or host country is generally ambiguous.
